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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ESCALATION OF WELFARE WARFARE: THE CASE
OF THE RECENT RESIDENT
Vivian Marie Thompson, plaintiff, migrated from Boston, Massa-
chusetts to Hartford, Connecticut to be near her mother. She arrived
without prospect of specific employment or sufficient funds to main-
tain herself and her child while attempting to locate work. During
her residency in Boston, she received financial support under a jointly-
funded state-federal program of Aid to Dependent Children (ADC). 1
When she applied for similar assistance in Hartford her request was
denied by defendant, Connecticut's Commissioner of Welfare, because
she had not been a resident of the state for one year as required by
Connecticut law.2 Plaintiff brought suit in the United States District
Court for the District of Connecticut3 seeking to have the residency
'Social Security Act, Title IV, 49 Stat. 627 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C.§8 601-09 (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 602-06 (Supp. I, 1965). General or public
assistance is financed and administered by state and local governmental units. Cate-
gorical public assistance is financed by state funds supplemented by matching federal
contributions. The states administer categorical public assistance; however, all state
plans must be approved by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare who has
established guidelines within which a state must operate in order to qualify for fed-
eral payments. Other forms of categorical assistance are: Old Age Assistance, Aid to
the Blind, Aid to the Disabled, Medical Assistance for the Aged, combinations of
programs for the aged, and Medical Assistance. See generally Wedemeyer and
Moore, The Ainerican WFelfare System, 54 Ctin. L. REv. 326 (1966).
2 CoNN. GENr. STAT. ANN,. § 17-2d (1965). Eligibility for temporary aid pend-
ing return of nonresidents.
When any person comes into this state without visible means of support for the
immediate future and applies for aid to dependent children under chapter 301 or
general assistance under part I of chapter 308 within one year from his arrival,
such person shall be eligible for temporary aid or care until arrangements are
made for his return, provided ineligibility shall not continue beyond the maxi-
mum federal residence requirement.
The maximum allowable state residence requirement under federal law is one year.
49 Stat. 627 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 602(b) (1959).
' The suit was brought under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284. An attempt was made by
counsel for the defendant to have the court apply the doctrine of equitable abstention
on the basis of plaintiff's failure to exhaust her administrative remedies, and her
failure to bring suit in the state court which might have interpreted the statute so as
to avoid any constitutional conflict. The court in exercising its discretion did not
choose to apply the doctrine because (1) there was no protection available to plain-
tiff from irreparable harm pending administrative proceedings, and (2) the statute
permits of only one interpretation so that a state court could not obviate the consti-
tutional issues. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 490-91 (1965), but see
Smith v. Board of Commissioners of the District of Columbia, 259 F. Supp. 423
(D.D.C. 1967). For a discussion of judicial review of state welfare practices and
further case citation see 67 CoLum. L. Rv. 84 (1967). Of particular interest
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requirement declared unconstitutional.4 The district court held: A
one year residency requirement for categorical5 public assistance is
invalid because it inhibits the exercise of the constitutionally protected
right to travel, and alternatively, the protection of state funds is not
a legitimate purpose for infringing upon the right to travel of a class
of citizen possessing neither cash assets, probability of specific em-
ployment, nor residence of one year. Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F.
Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967) prob. juris. noted, 36 U.S.L.W. 3286
(U.S. Jan. 16, 1968).
The origin of state and local statutes in the United States dealing
with indigent citizens can be traced to the English Poor Laws.' Like
its English counterpart American statutes required residency for a
stated term of years as a prerequisite for aid. This requirement was
intended to ensure that each community's burden of supporting the
poor was confined to the maintenance of its own inhabitants. It also
protected industrial cities from being overrun with unemployed agri-
cultural laborers, provided a steady labor supply for the seasonal-crop
farmers, and shielded a state from itinerant poor who were merely
seeking a higher level of support.
7
The Thompson controversy presents the problem of weighing the
state's interests in protecting its financial position' against the indi-
vidual's interest in being free to travel. Unable to discern the legal
source of the right to travel, the court analogized the right to first
amendment freedoms.' This analogy permitted the court to conclude
see id. at 92 n.56 in which reference is made to the refusal of the Connecticut welfare
administration to entertain petitions challenging the validity of state regulations on
federal constitutional grounds.
' Plaintiff brought suit as an individual additionally seeking to have an injunc-
tion issued against the continued enforcement of the statute and for payment of
monies unconstitutionally withheld. A discussion of issues raised by defendant con-
cerning the alleged inability of plaintiff to obtain a money judgment against the
state is beyond the scope of this casenote. Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331,
338, 341-42 (D. Conn. 1967) [hereinafter cited as Thompson]. Neither will the case-
note cover the question of mootness which stems from the qualification of plaintiff
for ADC at the time judgment was finally entered. Thompson at 342 t dissenting
Opinion).
Sec note 1, supra for the definition of categorical public assistance.
For an historical summary see Mandelker, The Settlement Requirement in Gen-
eral Assistance. 1955 WASH. U.L.Q. 335, 356-58. See also THE HERITAGE OF AMER-
ICA N SOCIAL WORK (R. Pumphrey and M. Pumphrey ed. 1961).
Z. CHAFEE, THREE HU-MAN RIGHTS IN TIHE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, 164-67 (1956).
'The state's financial position was being defended in terms of the state's abilities
to fund the entire spectrum of its assistance lrograms, not merely in terms of total
dollars and cents.
Thompson at 339 (dissenting opinion)
Uncontrolled demands upon Connecticut's welfare program could effect an overall
reduction of aid paid to eligible beneficiaries.
Thompson at 336.
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that the right to travel must be free from state action which tends to
inhibit or have a "chilling effect" upon one who exercises the right.
Apparently unwilling to base its decision on this assertion alone, the
court found that the state could not circumscribe the right to travel
by invoking its police power to protect the public purse.'0 Plaintiff
in Thompson could have qualified for public assistance if she had
entered the state with a specific job opportunity or with sufficient
resources to sustain her family while seeking employment prior to
becoming otherwise eligible.' 1 The Thompson court ruled that Con-
necticut had failed to establish 12 that individuals not possessing jobs
or cash stakes presented more of a drain on available funds than those
who do. The classifications were not reasonably suited to accomplish
the statute's purpose, and were both overly broad and an arbitrary
discrimination denying plaintiff the equal protection of the law.'3
The organization of this casenote will follow that of the Thompson
decision: (1) a discussion of the possible sources of the right to
travel, (2) an investigation of the court's analogy of the right to travel
to first amendment freedoms, and (3) an examination of the denial
of equal protection resulting from the court's view of the protection
of Connecticut's treasury as an invalid purpose for excluding needy
persons. While discussing the Thompson equal protection argument
a comparison will be made of the treatment given an essentially identi-
cal fact pattern by the Delaware District Court in Green v. Depart-
ment of Public Welfare of the State of Delaware. 4
10 Id.
'The phrase "without visible means of support for the immediate future" as used
in CoNN. GEN. STAT. AiNN. § 17-2d (1965) has been defined by the Connecticut
Welfare Department to mean:
1. Persons or families who arrive in Connecticut without specific employment.
2. Those arriving without regular income or resources sufficient to enable the
family to be self-supporting in accordance with Standards of Public Assist-
ance.
3. "Immediate future" means within three months after arriving in Connecticut.
1 CONNECTICUT WELFAE AfAMNUAL, Ch. II, § 219.1 as cited in Thompson at 333.
Plaintiff in Thompson did not qualify under either 1 or 2 above.
"The constitutionality of a statute is ordinarily presumed so that it is incum-
bent upon the plaintiff to come forward with rebutting evidence. It appears that the
court in Thompson shifted the burden of proof to the state. If the court was really
convinced of its analogy of the right to travel to first amendment freedoms, (see text
accompanying note 36-42 infra), once the allegation of overbreadth was made, the
defendant would bear the burden of establishing the validity of the legislation. See,
e.g., Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516(1945) ; but see KovAcs v. COOPER, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949) (concurring opinion of
Frankfurter, J.).
" Thompson at 336.
270 F. Supp. 173 (D. Del. 1967) [hereinafter cited as Green] ; for other cases
involving attacks on state residency requirements for categorical assistance eligibil-
ity still pending see 9 WEL.-PAR L. BULL. 10 (July 1967).
1968]
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I. SOURCES OF THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL
The source of the right to travel is critical in ascertaining the scope
of protection afforded the individual in exercising the right. There are
three potential sources of law from which the right to travel may be
derived: (1) the commerce clause,'" (2) the privileges and immuni-
ties clause of the fourteenth amendment," and (3) the basic liberties
inherent in national citizenship."'
There is considerable case authority supporting the position that
the commerce clause is the exclusive source of the right to travel.'"
If the right to travel is derived solely from the commerce clause,
however, plaintiff can not challenge as an infringement on the right
to travel the residency requirements in categorical public assistance
laws. The Social Security Act of 1935, as amended,' specifically
states that plans for ADC programs submitted for approval will not
be accepted if they contain eligibility requirements in excess of one
year. The language of the Connecticut statute20 demonstrates that
it was enacted in order to comply with the federal legislation. Since
Congressional power in the area of interstate commerce is plenary,2'
a state law properly implementing a Congressional program is beyond
constitutional question on commerce clause grounds.
The commerce clause is an inappropriate source of the right to
travel in the factual context of residence requirements for two reasons.
First, the commerce clause is traditionally a means of attacking state
laws that conflict with, rather than implement, federal law or policy.22
Second, the right of an individual to travel does not lend itself to
normal concepts of commerce.2:t A more appropriate source must be
'U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 3; Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
'U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2; New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1 (1959).
SU.S. Cosi. amend. V, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3; Kent v. Dulles,
357 U.S. 116 (1958). For a judicial survey of these sources see United States v.
Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 762-71 (1966)(opinion of Harlan, J. concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ; see also Z. CIHAFEE, supra note 7, at 184-213.
"See e.gi.. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849) ; Edwards v. California.
314 U.S.' 160 (1941) : Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867) (concurringopinion ).
"49 Stat. 627 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 602 (b) (1964).
'CoxN. Gi.N. STAT. A a,. § 17-2d (1965):
Pirovided ineligibility for aid to dependent children shall not continue beyond
the nia.rimntm federal residence requiremnent. (emphasis added).
"ee, e.g.. Milk Control Board v. Eisenberg Farm Products. 306 U.S. 346 (1939):
Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890): Gibbons v. Ogden. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1
(1824).
"See ,ienerally Note, Interstate Commerce and State Po'er, 27 VA. L. RE%. 1
(1940).
.;See Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in Edwards v. California, 314 U.S.
160, 181 (1941), in which he contends that the right of a human being to cross the
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located for a right which all agree has occupied such a primary posi-
tion in the development of this country.
A better source of the right to travel has been found in the privileges
of national citizenship.2 4 The early case of Corfield v. Coryel12 5
defined a privilege as being a fundamental right which belongs to the
citizens of all free governments. Included among these privileges is
"[t]he right of a citizen of one State to pass through, or to reside in
any other State.... ,26 The very concept of a nation as a unified
political entity must necessarily rely upon the ability of its individual
citizens to freely move about within its bordersY In Edwards v.
California,28 where one state attempted "to isolate itself from diffi-
culties common to all of them by the simple expedient of shutting its
gates to the outside world,"" concurring opinions of four Justices in-
terpreted the right to travel as a fundamental right of national citizen-
ship protected by the privileges and immunities clause. 30
If the right to travel is protected by the privileges and immunities
clause, then it is possible to argue that the portion of the Social
Security Act on residency requirements is a Congressional implemen-
tation of the right, as permitted by section five of the fourteenth
amendment." Assuming the validity of such an interpretation, the
continent should be placed on a higher plane than that of a railway carload of sheep.
Id. at 182:
But the migrations of a human being, of whom it is charged that he possesses
nothing that can be sold and has no wherewithal to buy, do not fit easily into my
notions of what is commerce. To hold that the measure of his rights is the com-
merce clause is likely to result eventually either in distorting the commercial
law or in denaturing human rights.
"See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78
(1908); Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270 (1900); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 36 (1873); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868); Crandall v.
Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
-4 Wash. C. C. 371 (U.S. Cir. Ct., E. D. Pa., 1825).
"I Id. at 380-81.
'United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966).
n314 U.S. 160 (1941).
Id. at 173; See Mandelker, supra note 6 at 358-66; Note, Interstate Migration and
Personal Liberty, 40 COLU.m. L. REv. 1032, 1032-35 (1940).
' The majority, focusing on the need for a unified national policy relied upon the
commerce clause to strike down the statute. In the face of such a single policy as
exists under the Social Security Act, the majority view would no longer be appli-
cable while the minority position remains viable.
314 U.S. at 177, 178 (concurring opinion of Douglas, J. in which Black, J. and
Murphy, J. join):
The right to move freely from State to State is an incident of national citizen-
ship protected by the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment against state interference.
'In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), the Court held that the McCulloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) test of necessary and proper would be
applied to appropriate legislation under section five of the fourteenth amendment. See
Comment, Fourteenth Amendinent Enforcement and Congressional Power to Abolish
19681
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residency requirements could be subjected to constitutional attack in
only one way. 2 A court would have to conclude that while Katzenbach
v. ilorgan"3 allowed Congress to expand the rights protected by the
fourteenth amendment, the opinion did not indicate that Congress
would be allowed to curtail such rights.34 A decision striking the resi-
dence requirement provision would not impinge the essential validity
of the Act since it contains a severability clause." However, the
possibility that under Katzenbach v. Morgan Congressional power
might be plenary demonstrates the weakness of finding the source of
the right to travel in the privileges and immunities clause.
Since the commerce clause will not and the privileges and immuni-
ties clause may not protect the right to travel from Congressional
action, the best choice of the source of the right to travel is that it
is an inherent right of national citizenship. Thus, the right to travel
would be protected from precipitous federal and state interference3"
by the due process clauses of the fifth3 7 and fourteenth amendments.
the States, 55 CALIF. L. REv. 293 (1967). Thus Congress has the power to pass legisla-
tion implementing the privileges and immunities clause.
The conclusion that the Social Security Act implements the privileges and im-
munities clause would require Congress to have anticipated (1) the concurring
opinions of Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) by six years, (2) the con-
clusion that those opinions would eventually become accepted by the majority of the
Court (which still has not happened), and (3) the McCulloch v. Maryland interpre-
tation of section five of the fourteenth amendment by 31 years. Such foresight is un-
likely.
'-'The fact that residency requirements are permissive, 49 Stat. 627 (1935), as
amended. 42 U.S.C. § 602 (b) (1964), would be irrelevant.
=384 U.S. 641 (1966).
This interpretation would dispose of issues raised by Mr. Justice Harlan's
dissent in Katzenbach '. Morgan. See, id. at 659.
-49 Stat. 648, 42 U.S.C. § 1303 (1964); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238
(1936).
"Assuming the continued validity of Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960)
(a 5-4 decision; only two majority Justices still on the Court), even the due process
clause might not protect a plaintiff in the context of residency requirements under
the Social Security Act. In Fleming the Court upheld termination of Social Secur-
ity benefits to aliens deported for being past members of the Communist Party. This
seems to indicate that there is sufficient scope for Congressional resonableness to
enable the exercise of Congressional authority in permitting residency requirements.
'7 Z. CIHAFEE, stpra note 7 at 209; Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500(1964) : Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 at 125 (1958) "The right to travel is part of the
'liberty' of which the citizen be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth
Amendment."
The scope of protection under due process is considerably broader than the protec-
tion afforded by the privileges and immunities clause. In the past the Supreme
Court has been reluctant to define what constitutes a privilege of national citizen-
ship, and once defined the privilege has been narrowly construed so as to leave the
state with as much freedom of action as possible. Compare Aptheker v. Secretary of
State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) with Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 436 (1935) (Stone, J.
dissenting) and Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 113 (1949)
(Jackson, J. concurring) ; see also Bell v. State of Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 242 (1964)
(Douglas, J. concurring); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496. 520 n.1 (1939) (Stone, J.
concurring).
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II. THE RIGHT To TRAVEL AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Not only is the source of the right to travel difficult to ascertain,
but also in the context of residence requirements and Congressional
legislation, it is a spurious issue." The controversy could have been
resolved without recourse to such an inconsequential argument.
Thompson connected the right to travel (from whatever source de-
rived) and the welfare residency requirements by analyzing United
States v. Guest39 and analogizing to first amendment cases. The con-
clusions reached do not survive analysis.
In Guest the defendants were charged with a violation of a federal
criminal statute' ° for having sought to intimidate a citizen because
he had exercised his right to travel by entering the state of Georgia.
Guest discusses the discouragement of the right to travel in terms of
the specific statute, rather than by dealing with the right in an abstract
fashion. The Thompson court, lacking such a statutory prohibition,
did not have the basis from which it could justify the striking down
of a presumptively valid act merely tending to discourage an indefinite
constitutional right. Although the denial of welfare benefits would
seem to be of a different class than threats of violence, such a denial
of funds could have an equally potent deterrent effect upon those
without means of maintaining themselves. An additional distinction
between Guest and Thompson is that the defendant in Guest had the
specific intent to discourage the exercise of the right, while the Con-
necticut statute was an indirect inhibition.
In an effort to buttress its argument that the right to travel is
protected against state inhibition, the court in Thompson drew an
analogy between the discouragement of the right to travel and the
Plaintiff attempted to raise article IV of the Constitution as a means of attack-
ing the Connecticut statute, but the court correctly discounted the attack since article
IV is designed to protect the citizen of one state from being subjected to a condition
of alienage while temporarily within the boundaries of another state. U.S. CONST.
art. IV, § 2; U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1; Thompson at 334.
Furthermore, the right to travel cases involve situations where either the state
or federal government attempted to totally prohibit the travel of certain individuals.
See; e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) ; Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S.
500 (1964) ; Kent v. Dulles. 357 U.S. 116 (1958) (passports) ; Edwards v. California,
314 U.S. 160 (1941); City of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837)
(transporters subjected to criminal statutes); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.)
35 (1867) (taxes which could be extended to exclude). Plaintiff in Thompson did,
however, exercise her right to travel.
383 U.S. 745 (1966). The case involved a direct attempt on the part of private
citizens to bar the use of interstate highways by Negro citizens through overt and
covert intimidations.
0 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1964). The statute denounces the conspiring to intimidate a
citizen in the exercise of a constitutionally secured right or privilege.
1968]
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"cases proscribing actions which have a chilling effect on First Amend-
ment rights."'" Although in Aptheker v. Secretary of State "4 2 the
right to travel was declared to be closely related to the rights of free
speech and association, the interests being guarded there were sub-
stantially different from those confronting the Thompson court. The
statute43 held invalid in Aptheker prevented from travelling overseas
those who exercised these first amendment freedoms by being mem-
bers of the Communist Party. The Supreme Court was not considering
the right to travel separately, but rather as a means of protecting the
plaintiff's rights of free speech and association. In Thompson there
were no first amendment freedoms with which the right to travel
might be linked. By intimating that the right to travel is a first
amendment freedom through analogy, and then using first amendment
cases to show that such a right may not be infringed by the qualifying
of a benefit,44 the Thompson court lifted itself by its bootstraps,
although the approach did succeed in avoiding the question of legis-
lative power posed by focusing on the sources of the right to travel.
The difficult issue which the court overlooked in Thompson was
this: If state residency requirements discourage the right to travel,
a state which offers no assistance would present an even greater dis-
couragement.4" The court's reasoning, extended to its logical conclu-
sion, leads to the incredible outcome of a grant in aid by one state
Thompson at 336 citing Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965) and Wolff
v. Selective Service Local Board No. 16, 372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967). Both of these
cases involved the protection of the freedom of speech and in Dombrowski the pro-
tection of the freedom of association as well.
'378 U.S. 500 (1964) (dictum) ; see The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 HARV.
L. REV. 179, 195 (1964). The factual context of Aptheker presented a controversy
involving the right to travel outside of the nation, and not the right to interstate
travel. For a discussion of the right of United States citizens to travel abroad see
Comment, Judicial Review of the Right to Travel: A Proposal, 42 WASH. L. REv.
873 (1967).
" § 6 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950. 64 Stat. 993, 50 U.S.C.
§ 785 (1950), which makes it a criminal offense for any member of the Communist
Party to apply for, renew or be issued a passport; or to use or attempt to use a
previously obtained passport.
"Since "[tihere is no legal obligation on the State... to support its poor," the
gratuitous benefit of public assistance could not be classified as a right. Heydereich
v. Lyons, 374 Ili. 557, 30 N.E.2d 46 at 51 (1940). In this case the Illinois court sus-
tained a statute calling for a three year period of residency in order to qualify for
public assistance. The reasoning was that so long as the state was not obligated to
furnish aid for the benefit of any of its citizens, it had a large degree of discretion
in conditioning who should receive that aid which it chose to grant. See also the
dissent in In re Chirillo, 238 N.Y. 417, 28 N.E.2d 895 (1940) ; but see Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
" Contra, Harvith, The Constitutionality of Residence Tests for General and
Categorical Assistance Programs, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 567, 593-96 (1966); Harvith,
Federal Equal Protection and Welfare Assistance, 31 ALBANY L. REV. 210 (1967).
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to a class of indigents constitutionally requiring an equal or greater
grant by all states. The end result is that the federal judiciary, sitting
as if it were a state legislature, would determine the benefits a state
must provide.
III. EQUAL PROTECTION
Perhaps recognizing the weakness of basing its decision on the right
to travel and the tenuous grounds of analogy, the court in Thompson
proceeded to hold that the Connecticut statute was a violation of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. It was this
argument which was successful in Green. In both cases joint state-
federal assistance was denied because the applicant had not resided
within the state for one year. In Thompson the legislative classifica-
tion consisted of those who had arrived within the state without visible
means of support and who applied for assistance within one year
from arrival;46 in Green the legislative classification was those who
otherwise met all qualifications for eligibility yet had not resided
within the state for one year prior to application.4 7 The purpose of
the Connecticut statute was candidly admitted to be the protection of
the state purse "by discouraging entry of those who came needing
relief;"4 the purpose of the Delaware statute as enunciated in a pre,
amble was the promotion of the "welfare and happiness of all of the
people of the State;"' 49 however, the Deputy Attorney General sug-
gested that the principle purpose was the discouragement of "needy
persons from entering Delaware and thereby to protect the public
purse." 0 In both states the classes of similarly situated persons were
those who were in need of assistance. Both Thompson and Green
concluded that for a statute which operates in an unequal manner to
be valid, the legislative purpose for which it was enacted must be
drawn in such a way as to reasonably accomplish the legitimate
purpose.51
"
0The method of analysis employed is that of Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal
Protection of the Laws, 37 CA.uI L. REv. 341 (1949). Thompson at 332-33; see note
2, supra for the Connecticut statute; see note 11, supra for the definition of "without
visible means of support for the immediate future" as used in the statute.
" Green at 176; 31 Dz. CODE § 501 et seq. (1967); WASH. REV. CODE § 74.12.030
(1962) is analogous to the Delaware statute in establishing the criteria for eligibility.
Thompson at 336-37.
"Green at 177.Id.
Both district courts also recognized that the respective state legislatures had
not drawn their states' classifications along inherently suspect grounds such as race,
creed and color. Neither did Connecticut draw its classifications on the basis of
wealth. Justice Jackson, concurring in Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 184-85
1968]
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Before reaching the issue of the purpose of protecting the public
purse, the Green court held that discrimination based on residence of
one year could find no constitutional support from the declaration of
legislative intent to promote welfare and happiness, because in oper-
ation the requirement denied what it sought to promote. The Dela-
ware statute was invalid because the manner in which it was applied
frustrated its purpose.
Thompson and Green, relying on Edwards v. California,5" held that
the burden on the state treasury is not a valid justification for dis-
couraging the entry of those in need of assistance. 3 The Green deci-
sion recognized that the protection of the public purse was a worthy
goal, at least in the abstract, but that it was not a permissible ground
for differentiating between similarly situated persons. 4 The Thomp-
son decision confused the purpose of the statute, the protection of the
state fisc, with the means by which it was to be attained, the exclusion
of the needy. The Thompson court, in effect, condemned the means
as an invalid purpose. 5 The net results were identical; both statutes
were held to deny equal protection of the law because the legislative
purposes for which they were enacted were not legitimate.
The courts in Thompson and Green distinguish the cases involving
the lawful use of residence requirements as prerequisites for the right
to vote.5 6 The state has a legitimate interest in limiting the franchise
to qualified citizens educated in local affairs and affected in common
by subsequent legislation. "But certainly it takes little logic to con-
clude" as did the court in Green57 "that the need for food, clothing
and lodging has an aspect of immediacy which differentiates it in kind
from the right to vote." Nevertheless the voting cases do illustrate
(1941), argued that the "mere state of being without funds is a neutral fact--consti-
tutionally an irrelevance, like race, creed or color." His position would result in
indigence being a fourth forbidden or inherently suspect criteria. See also Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) ; Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
"'314 U.S. 160 (1940).
Thompson at 337; Green at 177.
Green at 177.
Thompson at 337.
The Supreme Court has sustained a one year residency requirement on the
right to vote in state elections. Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904) ; cf. Carring-
ton v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965). Their use in federal elections has also been sus-
tained, Brueding v. Devlin, 234 F. Supp. 721 (D. Md. 1964), aff'd per curiam, 380
U.S. 125 (1965), but this case has been subjected to a narrow interpretation. Har-
vith, The Constitutionality of Residence Tests for General and Categorical Assist-
ance Programs, supra note 45, at 623-26. It is to be noted that the states determine the
qualifications for franchise under the Constitution, art. I, §§ 2 and 5 but that there is no
explicit grant of power to the states to establish criteria for eligibility to receive
aid. But see U.S. CONST. amend X.
" Green at 178.
[ VOL. 43 : 821
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
that there is nothing inherently suspect about the use of residency
tests in appropriate circumstances.
It would seem absurd to say that a state legislature could not be
legitimately concerned with the protection of funds obtained from
its own citizens. If the state has a legitimate interest in protecting
its financial resources, and the use of residency tests are acceptable
in some situations, the invalidity of the Connecticut and Delaware
laws must depend upon the means by which the purpose was to be
accomplished. Therefore, one must search for other available means.
The Delaware District Court provided a clue as to a possible means
by which the purpose might be attained when it declined to reach
the question "as to whether a state could constitutionally confine the
benefits of its public assistance programs to its own domiciliaries."58
Those who are domiciliaries within the common law definition of the
term would most likely have either been in the state long enough
to have contributed to the funds out of which they would receive aid
should they become in need of assistance, or they would have demon-
strated an intention to remain indefinitely so that they might later be
in a position to contribute taxes. In either case the state treasury
receives a small degree of insulation from those who would come into
the state in a transitory capacity while making a journey to another
state.
Admittedly this is an extremely narrow area of protection, 0 but
any enlargement would lead to a similar equal protection infringement
controversy as existed under the residency requirements. Confining
benefits to domiciliaries does enable those who enter the state with
genuine purposes to qualify for assistance even though they have not
necessarily contributed to the state in economic terms."' In Thompson
Connecticut's classification included some people who did nof repre-
sent a disproportionate drain on the treasury and excluded some who
did. A statute confining benefits to those who meet the common law
Id. at 179.
WFor the purpose of this discussion the Delaware common law definition of
domiciliary "as one who is physically present in [the state] with an intention to
remain indefinitely.. ." will be used. Green at 177.
' The area of protection is confined to that period of time in excess of three
months but short of the time necessary to determine whether the applicant is a quali-
fied domiciliary. This is because of the common provision in state public assistance
laws granting temporary aid to those in need up to a maximum of 90 days. See note
2 supra for the reference Connecticut's statute makes to temporary aid recipients.
' Plausible purposes which the court felt were legitimate included: hope of




definition of a domiciliary would not be subject to a similar attack on
overbreadth. Determination of intent to remain could be made in the
time which is currently required to eliminate fraud through investiga-
tion of the applicant's eligibility. 2 There would be no undue periods
of deprivation.
The Supreme Court will hear the appeal of the Thompson decision.
It is probable there will be a definitive answer to the legitimacy of
state residency requirements for categorical assistance.13  It is not
likely that the Court will allow itself to become immersed in inconclu-
sive arguments attempting to discover the source of the right to travel.
The argument that should be persuasive is that classifications drawn
by the Connecticut legislature in attempting to accomplish the protec-
tion of the public purse were not drawn in such a way as to make pur-
pose and classification coterminous. The Court cannot help but con-
sider the impact which its decision will have on pending welfare litiga-
tion throughout the nation and on the ability of the states to continue
as financially viable units. It is estimated that the cost of welfare
could increase by as much as three times its present national level if
the pending litigation covering the entire spectrum of public assistance
is resolved in favor of the would-be recipients. 4 The Supreme Court
ought to recognize a state's legitimate interest in its fiscal posture
while demonstrating that there are constitutional limits on methods of
protecting that interest.
The Thompson court appreciated that there were reasons for which a state
vould need a pause between application and payment of funds:
[I]f there were here a time applied equally to all, for the purpose of pre-
vention of fraud, investigation of indigency or other reasonable administrative
need, it would undoubtedly be valid.
Id at 338.
N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1968, at 20, col. 8.
" N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1968 § 4 (The Week in Review), at 13, col. 8.
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